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Introduction
This article aims at handling knowledge about large scale spatial properties (e.g. soil type, weather), in contexts where this knowledge is only partial; i.e. some piece of information is known only at some given lo cations of space. We have investigated some means to perform plausible reasoning on this kind of informa tion at any point in the considered space.
Several studies can be related to the question of imprecise knowledge in spatial databases, but they usually consider the question of representing incom plete knowledge about the location of spatial ob jects (using relational theories, more or less related to the seminal work of [Randell et al., 1992] , or us ing fuzzy locations [Bloch, 2000] ), or about vague re gions [Cohn and Gotts, 1996] , rather than about static properties and their distribution over a given space. [Wiirbel et al., 2000] apply revision strategies to in consistency removing in geographical information sys tems.
A completely different line of work, in the robotics literature, deals with map building using oc cupancy grids (see e.g. [Iyengar and Elfes, 1991] ); it will be briefly discussed in Section 5.2.
While plausible reasoning has been applied to a vari ety of domains, it has rarely been applied to reasoning about spatial information. On the other hand, it has been applied to reasoning about temporal information, which gives some hints about how to do it for spa tial information. Plausible reasoning about systems that evolve over time usually consists in assuming that fluents1 do not change and therefore that their value persist from one time point to the subsequent one, un less the contrary is known (from an observation, for instance) or inferred; this implies some minimization of change. Now, the latter persistence paradigm can be transposed from temporal to spatial reasoning. In the very same line of reasoning, when reasoning about properties in space, it is (often) intuitively satisfactory to assume that, knowing from an observation that a given property r.p holds at a given point x, then it holds as well at points "close enough" to x.
What we precisely mean by "close enough" depends on the nature of the region as well as on the property r.p involved. Moreover, it is clear that the belief that r.p "persists" from point x to point y is gradually de creasing: the closer y to x, the more likely r.p observed at x is still true at y. This graduality can be modelled by order relations or by quantitative measures such as probability. However, as we explain in Section 3, pure probabilistic reasoning is not well-suited to this kind of reasoning, unless very specific assumptions are made.
We therefore model persistence with the help of the belief function theory, also known as the Dempster Shafer theory. Belief functions (and their duals, plau sibility functions) generalize probability measures and enable a clear distinction between randomness and ig norance that probability measures fail to do.
After giving some background on belief functions, we show how to infer plausible conclusions, weighted by belief degrees, from spatial observations. Then, we relate computational experiments, evoke information theoretic and decision-theoretic issues, and conclude.
2
Background on belief functions
The Dempster�Shafer theory of evidence [Dempster, 1967] [Shafer, 1976] is a generalization of probability theory enabling an explicit distinction between randomness and ignorance.
Let S be a fi nite set of possible states of the world (taken to be the set for possible values for a given vari represents the probability of existence of at least one true piece of evidence which does not contradict A.
When all focal elements are singletons, m can be viewed as a probability distribution on S; in this case Belm (A) = Plm(A) = LsEA m(s), hence, Belm and Plm coincide and are identical to the probability mea sure induced by m. Therefore Dempster-Shafer theory generalizes probability theory on finite universes.
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence enables an explicit distinction between randomness and ignorance that probability theory cannot 2 . Another crucial ad vantage of the theory of belief functions is that it is 2This is clear from the following two mass functions:
mi{head,tails} = 1; m2({head}) = m2({tails}) = %· m2 represents a true random phenomenon such as toss ing a regular coin, while m, would correspond to a case where it is not reasonable to define prior probabilities on {head, tails} -imagine for instance that you were just given a parrot with the only knowledge that the two words it knows are ''head" and "tails": there is absolutely no reason to postulate that it says "heads" and "tails" ran domly with a probability % (nor with any other probabil ity) ; it may well be the case, for instance, that it always say "head". The resulting m1 ffiu m2 (0) measures the degree of conflict between m1 and m2.
Lastly, in some cases it is needed to transform a mass assignment into a probability distribution. This is the case for instance when performing decision-theoretic tasks. Importantly, this transformation should take place after combination has been performed and not before, as argued in [Smets and Kennes, 1994 ] who in troduce the pignistic transform T(m) of a normalized mass assignment m, being the probability distribution on S defined by: Vs E S, T(m)( s) :::: LA<;:S,•EA ���) · Alternatives to the pignistic transform for decision making using belief functions are given in [Strat, 1994] .
3 Extrapolation from observations 3.1
Observations
From now on we consider a space E, i.e., a set of "spatial points" (which could be seen as either Eu clidean points or atomic regions). E is equipped with a distance3 d.
We are interested in reasoning on the evolution "in space" of some properties. For the sake of simplicity, the property of interest merely consists of the value of function m(S) = 1. 3Recall that a distance is a mapping d : E2 -t JR+ such as (i) d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y; (ii) d(x, y) = d(y, x) and (iii) d(x, y ) + d(y, z)::; d(x, z). However we do not really require the triangular inequality (iii); hence our formal framework only requires d to be a pseudo-distance but these technical details will not be discussed further.
a given variable, whose domain is a finite set S. S is furthermore assumed to be purely qualitative, i.e., Si s not a discretized set of numerical values. S may be for instance a set of possible soil types, or a set of weather types. The simplest case is when S may is binary, i.e., the property of interest is a propositional variable the truth value of which we are interested in -for instance S= {rain,-,rain}.
An observation function 0 is a mapping from Dom(O) � E to the set of nonempty subsets of S. 0 intuitively consists of a set of pointwise observations (x, O(x)) where x E E and O(x) is a nonempty subset of S; such a pointwise observation means that it has been observed that the state of the world at point x be longs to O(x ) . 0 is said to be complete at x if O(x) is a singleton and trivial at x ifO(x) = S. The range R(O) of 0 is the set of points where a nontrivial observation has been performed, i.e., R(O) = {x! O(x) f. S}.
3.2
Spatial persistence
The question is now how to extrapolate from an ob servation function 0. As explained in the introduc tion, the spatial persistence principle stipulates that as long as nothing contradicts it, a property observed at a given point is believed to hold at points nearby, with a quantity of belief decreasing with the distance to the observation. This principle is now formally en coded in the framework of belief functions. Let x be a given point of E, called the focus point. 
1. f is non-increasing in its second argument, i.e., a� f3 implies f(X,a):::; f(obs,{3); to hold, the probability of the relevant persistence of V = v from y to x (which may sometimes be under stood as the probability of continuous persistence from x to y -this will be discussed later), according to the formula above, is exp(-t(�)) ). In particular, if
is the "half persistence" of V = v, i.e., the dfstance for which the probability of "relevant" persis tence is equal to �, then we have J.. ( v) = t·:f).
Now, when Vi s not a singleton, the persistence decay function of V will be taken to be the persistence func tion of the most weakly persistent element of v, i.e.,
The critical point is the reference to relevant persis tence rather than with simple persistence. Assume that we try to build an approximately valid weather map and that the property rain = true observed at point x. Clearly, this property being known to have a significant spatial persistence, this piece of knowledge is a strong evidence to believe that it is also raining at a very close pointy, such as, say, d(:r, y) = 1km. This is not at all an evidence to believe that is raining at z where d(x, z) = 8000km, hence, the impact of x on z regarding rain is (almost) zero. This does not mean that the probability of raining at z is (almost) zero. It may well be the case that it is raining at :r; but in this case, the fact that it is raining at z is (almost certainly ) unrelated to the fact that it is raining at x, because, for instance, the air masses and the pressure at these two points (at the same time) are independent. The im pact /(rain, d(x, z)) =true of x on z regarding rain can be interpreted as the probability that, knowing that it is raining at x, it is also raining at z and these two points are in the same "raining region". Hence the terminology "relevant persistence", which may also be interpreted as "continuous persistence" (i.e., persis tence along a continuous path) if we assume moreover that a raining region is self-connected5.
This is where the difference between pure probability and belief functions (recall that they generalize prob ability theory ) is the most significant: in a pure prob abilistic framework, this impact degree, or probability of relevant persistence, cannot be distinguished from a usual probability degree. If we like to express prob abilities of persistence in a pure probabilistic frame work, we need a mapping 9rain : E 2 --
Prob(H olds(x, rain)IH olds(y, rain ))= 9rain ( d (:c, y) ).
This mapping g is different from f. More precisely, g 2: f holds, and g and f are closer and closer to f as d(x, y) is smaller and smaller; when d(x, y) becomes large (with respect to the persistence degree of rain), the impact g tends to 0 while g tends to the prior prob ability of raining at x. From this we draw the follow ing conclusion: a pure probabilistic modelling of spatial persistence needs not only some knowledge about how properties persist over space but also a prior probabil ity that the property holds at each point of space; the latter, which may be hard to obtain, is not needed with the belief function modelling of persistence.
The second drawback of a pure probabilistic modelling of spatial persistence is the lack of distinguishability between ignorance and conflict. Suppose (without loss of generality ) that the (uniform) prior probability of persistence is �· Consider the four points w, x, y, z where x is very close to x and y and half way between both, and w is very far from x. Suppose that it has been observed that it is raining at y and that it is not raining at z. The probability, as well as the be lief, that it is raining at :r, are very close to �. The 5and, in a stronger way, by "linearly continuous per sistence" if we assume that a raining region is not only self-connected but also convex.
explanation of this value � is the following: the two pieces of evidence that it is raining at y and not rain ing at z have a strong impact on x and are in conflict.
An analogy with information merging from multiple sources is worthwhile: the rain observed at y and the absence of rain at z both can be considered as informa tion sources, the first one telling that it is raining at x and the second one that it is not, the reliability of the sources being function of the distance between them and the focus point x. In the absence of a reason to believe more one source than the other one, the prob ability that it is raining at x is �. This has nothing to do with the prior probability of p ersistence: had this prior been 0.25, the probability that it is raining at x would still have been �· Consider now w as the focus point. w being very far from y and z, their impact is almost zero and the prob ability of rain at w is (extremely close to) the prior probability of rain, i.e., �· This value of � is a prior and comes from ignorance rather than with conflict.
Therefore, probability cannot distinguish from what
happens at x and at w, i.e., it cannot distinguish be tween confiictual information and lack of information.
Belief funct i ons, on the other hand, would do this dis tinction: while the belief of raining at x would have been close to �, the belief of raining at w, as well as the belief of not raining at w, would have been dose to 0. Hence the second conclusion: a pure probabilis tic modelling of spatial persistence does not allow for a distinction between confiictual information and lack of information, while the belief function modelling does.
3.3
Combination
Once each observation is translated into a simple sup port function my<-+x, the belief about the value of the variable V is computed by combining all mass assign ments m y <-+x for y E R(O). 
\· -----------------+-------------.:') y
10
? mx<-+w ( {true}) m x<-+w ( {true, false})
The combination m<-+w = mx<-+w Ef) my'-+w Ef) mz<-tw yields m<-+w ( {true}) m<-+w ({false}) mx<-tw ({true, false})
Clearly, this is not what we expect, because x and y being close to each other, the pieces of information that it is raining at z and at y are clearly not inde pendent, and thus the mass assignments mx<-tw and m y <-tw should not be combined as if they were inde pendent. On the other hand, on the following figures, where mx<-tw, mx<-tw and mx'-+w are identical to those above but x is no longer close to y, the above result m<-t w = mx<-tw $my<-tw EBmz<-tw is intuitively correct. To remedy this problem, we introduce a discounting factor when combining mass assignments. The dis count grows with the dependence between the sources, i.e., with the proximity between the points where ob servations have been made.
We use here a method inspired from multi-criteria decision making (where positive or negative interac tions between criteria have to be taken into account when aggregating scores associated to the different cri teria) . Assuming that E is finite, for X � E and x E E \X, we introduce a conditional importance de gree J-t.(xiX) E [0, 1] expressing the importance of the knowledge gathered at point x once the points in X have been taken into account. The quantity 1-J-t.(xiX) is therefore a discount due to the dependence with the information at x and the information already gath ered.Intuitively, it is desirable that "the further x from X", the higher J.l(xiX). When xis sufficiently far from X, there is no discount and J.l.(xiX) is taken to be 1. e------r-. Takmg ). = 10, on the exam pie of figure 1 In practice, it is often the case that each pointwise observation is precise, i.e., O(yi) = {v;} for each y; E R(O). In this case, the above combination op eration can be written in a much simpler way: the mass of a value { v} can be expressed as follows, given a few preliminary notations : Vm;, ::
.n]/ m k({v;}) = 0}. In that case, it is easy to show that combination without discount yields:
m( v; ) = (1-(0kEP, ( 1 -a:�c))) * (0 kEP, ( 1 -a:�c )).
Whereas combination with discount yields:
ogy with fuzzy measures and interaction indexes in multi criteria decision making, would be rather long and compli cated to explain without introducing further several defi nitions. We omit it because this is not the main scope of the paper.
Experiments
We recall that what we focus on is the plausible ex trapolation of information: given a set of observations on E, what is the likelihood of the truth of a formula on a point outside of the set of observations ? For the experiments, we used a binary value domain, namely S = {white, black}.
We compute the overall mass assignment for each lo cation x in the space E, by combining the mass as signment induced by every point y in the observation set R(O). We have two courses of action from here.
Either we make a plain Dempster combination of all the simple support functions mx = EByER(O) my<-+x, ei ther we make a correction based on a Choquet integral applied to the exponents (as explained at the end of that illustrates well the principled we use here. Obviously, these factors should be tailored for specific spatial proper ties with respect to the scale of the actual observed space. Moreover, other distances could be considered where the interaction and persistence of relevance would take into account other factors. 
5.1
Information intensity maps
Our framework can be used to measure the variations of the quantity of information over space. In order to do so, we may compute a probability distribution on S at each point of E, using for instance the pig nistic transform, and the information level at each point can then be computed using usual information-theoretic measures such as entropy8. Hence we can build a map where each point x is associated to the entropy of its final probability distribution. Entropy increases as information decreases; in other words, the quantity 1-H (p) measure the quantity of information of p. Minimal entropy is obtained at points at which at a complete observation has been made. Maximal entropy is obtained at points associated with a uni form probability distribution (if any). Note that this uniform probability distribution may come either from conflictual observations or from a lack of information:
as explained in Section 3.2, once the combined mass assignment has been transformed into a probability distribution, there is no longer a way to distinguish conflict from lack of knowledge. This is true independently of the number of values we consider for a spatial fluent, but to illustrate the process, we show on fi gure 3 the level of information using as before the 2-valued set S = {white, black}.
In this case, the quantity of information 1 -H(p) Once a series of measurements has been done, one may decide either to stop the measurements, or, if the quan tity information is considered high enough (relatively to the expected cost of new measurements), we can then easily compute a "plausible map" from the re sult of the combination step, by assigning each point of the space a value with the highest probability, in order to represent the most likely distribution of the spatial property considered. Figure 4 shows the result on a sample observation set, with two different levels of gray for each value. One can again observe that the correction decreases the likeliness of a value near con curring measures. In practise, it would probably be better to decide of a threshold under which the belief in a value is irrelevant before pignistic transformation.
If we know indeed that the belief in value 1 is 0.05, and belief in value 2 is 0.04, (thus the belief in the set {1,2} is 0.91), we don't want to assume it is more likely that value 1 holds and thus we would like the map to remain undetermined at this point.
9This heuristics is widely used in model-based diagnosis when choosing the next test to perform. We have given here a way of using a set of theoreti cal tools for the study of (partial) spatial information.
By modelling intuitions about the likelihood of spa tial properties which depend only on distance factors (persistence, influence), we have shown how to infer plausible information from a set of observations. The
field is now open to experimental investigations of the various parameters we have introduced in a generic way, as our ideas have been quite easy to implement.
Our way of extrapolating beliefs could be applied to other fields than spatial reasoning. A similar use of belief functions is made in [Denoeux, 1995] for classi fication and by [Hiillermeyer, 2000] for case-based rea soning. However, these frameworks do not consider possible interactions before combining, probably be cause this issue is less crucial in the contexts they con sider than in spatial reasoning.
We think a number of paths can be now followed that would show the relevance of this work for spatial representation and reasoning. First of all, we now need to focus on the intrinsic characteristics of spatial properties that may influence the parameters we have considered here. Persistence is certainly dependent on more factors that mere distance (for instance, rain is influenced by terrain morphology), and it would be useful to isolate which kind of information could be combined with our framework. The second orientation we have only sketched here is related to spatial decision problem. If we are interested in identifying the extension of a spatial property (let's say the presence of oil in the ground for the sake of argument), it would be useful to take into account information about the possible shape (convex or not)
or the possibly bounded size of the observed fluent, as it will influence the location of an interesting (i.e.
informative) new observation.
